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POLICE INFORMERS AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
 
 
Clive Harfield 1
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia 
 
 
 
Police use of informers is morally problematic at a number of levels: at the level of the institution; at 
the level of investigation management within the institution; and at the level of the individual (both 
informer and police officer). Drawing upon the author’s practitioner experience of managing 
informers in England, this paper explores the ethics of informing within the context of Miller and 
Blackler’s moral theory of policing.2
 
  
Informers are understood to be individuals who supply information about other persons 
covertly to the authorities, usually in expectation of some form of reward and usually at the 
instigation of the authorities. 3
                                                          
1 The author is grateful to John Kleinig for his helpful and supportive comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
 The information thus supplied is specifically characterized: it is 
information leading to intelligence or evidence that the authorities need to pursue enforcement or 
regulatory investigation and which cannot be obtained by other means. The informer has access to 
such information by virtue of his or her relationship with the individual subject of the information. 
The informer and police are involved in a covert relationship which deceives the individual about 
 
2 Seumas Miller and John Blackler, Ethical Issues in Policing (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) chapter 1. 
 
3 Informers are thus distinguished here from informants: individuals who volunteer information motivated by 
civic duty with no expectation of reward, for instance a member of the public contacting police to alert them 
to a road traffic collision, or a citizen who anonymously leaves information on a ‘crimestoppers’ hotline 
message system. Notwithstanding the distinction drawn here, it should be noted that the terms are often used 
interchangeably in the academic literature and in journalism. For the purposes of this paper, a police officer 
involved in the day-to-day running of an informer will be referred to as the ‘handler’. 
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whom information is being passed. 4
 
  When viewed from the perspective of the person being 
informed against this deception, even though at its simplest no more than a non-disclosure, is a 
prima facie moral harm. That the information passed will be used to the disadvantage of the 
individual informed against is an additional moral harm. 
Informers are generally utilised by law enforcement and intelligence agencies but in the 
United Kingdom, for example, statutory provision for the use of informers - termed in the legislation 
‘covert human intelligence sources’ - extends to local government, central government and  
regulatory agencies as well as police agencies. 5   Certain criminal jurisdictions, for example in the 
United States of America, provide a defence in law of entrapment to protect individuals from being 
lured into committing crimes by informers (so-called ‘sting’ operations) and thus investing a 
particular expression of moral harm associated with informers with an adverse procedural 
consequence for the users of informers. Other jurisdictions (for example in the United Kingdom and 
Australia) provide no such defence although the manner in which an informer has been used may 
give grounds either for arguing that certain evidence should be excluded or grounds for arguing 
mitigation when sentencing.6
 
 
                                                          
4 It is not necessary for the purpose of this paper to distinguish between deception and lying. Both might be 
employed in the business of informing. (On the distinction see Jonathon Adler, ‘Lying, deceiving or falsely 
implicating’. Journal of Philosophy 94(9) (1997), 435-452. 
 
5 See, for example, Clive Harfield and Karen Harfield, Covert Investigation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd 
edition, 2012), chapter 9 of which discusses the statutory framework for the deployment of informers in the 
criminal jurisdiction of England and Wales, which forms one of the three criminal jurisdictions in the UK (the 
other two being Scotland and Northern Ireland). For a list of authorities empowered in England and Wales to 
use informers see the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Schedule 1 (as amended). 
 
6 The term ‘entrapment’ describes both method and outcome. Significant and ongoing interdisciplinary debate 
prevails concerning the concept of entrapment. See, for example, Andrew Ashworth, (1999). ‘What is wrong 
with entrapment? [1999]  Singapore Journal of Legal Studies: 293-317; Gideon Yaffe, ‘ "The government 
beguiled me": the entrapment defense and the problem of private entrapment'.’ Journal of Ethics and Social 
Philosophy 1, (2005)  1-33; and David Ormerod, ‘Recent developments in entrapment.’ [2006] Covert Policing 
Review: 65-86. 
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The inherent vulnerabilities (besides successful application of the entrapment defence) to 
which law enforcement and regulatory agencies are exposed when utilising informers have long 
been recognised and documented.7   The potential harmful consequences arising from reliance upon 
informers include the individual corruption of those employed as law enforcement officers and even 
the institutional corruption of law enforcement agencies themselves.8   Concern has been expressed 
in both academic literature and in the popular media about the general management of informers 
and the nature of the relationship between informers and those who utilise them. 9   Criminal 
biographies illustrate the social and personal harms, including physical violence, to which informers 
are vulnerable. 10
                                                          
7 See for example Paul Cooper and Jon Murphy, ‘Ethical approaches for police officers when working with 
informants in the development of criminal intelligence in the United Kingdom’ Journal of Society and Politics 
26, no.2 (1997) :1-20; Colin Dunningham and Clive Norris, ‘Some ethical dilemmas in the handling of police 
informants’ Public Money and Management 18, no.1  (1998):21-25; Jon Moran, ‘Evaluating Special Branch and 
the use of informant intelligence in Northern Ireland’ Intelligence and National Security 25, no.1,  (2010):1-23. 
  It is the immoral milieu within which such individuals live that forms the basis of 
their value as informers. 
 
8 Roy Clark, ‘Informers and corruption,’ in Informers: Policing, Policy, Practice, ed. Roger Billingsley, Teresa 
Nemitz and Philip Bean (Cullompton: Willan, 2001), 38-49. 
 
9 See Colin Dunningham and Clive Norris, ‘The detective, the snout, and the Audit Commission: the real costs in 
using informants’ The Howard Journal 38, no.1, (1999):67-86 for a critical review of a policy actively 
encouraging informer recruitment as the most cost-effective method of crime investigation: the auditors had 
failed to factor in the full on-costs of informer management in determining the supposed cost-effectiveness of 
this tactic. (Police managers can be more concerned about monthly performance measures than perennial 
ethics.) In ‘The untouchables: crime fighters let gangsters take the money and run’, investigative reporters 
Linton Besser and Dylan Welch observed that within the New South Wales Crime Commission, tasked with 
investigating serious organized crime in New South Wales, Australia, “An 'ends justify the means’ culture exists 
at senior levels. It manifests itself in inadequate record keeping, the routine relaxation of policies governing 
the handling of informants and inaccurately reporting its financial achievements.”  Sydney Morning Herald, 
February 12, 2011. NSWCC Assistant Director Mark Standen was convicted in August 2011 of conspiracy to 
import precursor chemicals for narcotic production and of perverting the course of justice. His co-conspirators 
included one of his informers, James Kinch, currently fighting extradition to Australia: Sydney Morning Herald, 
August 12, 2001; also August 15, 2011. For a recent study of how different American law enforcement 
agencies and prosecutors utilise informers in one US State, and concerns about the management of the 
investigator/informer relationship and the recruitment and abandonment of informers by such agencies, see 
Delores Jones-Brown and Jon Shane, An Exploratory Study of the Use of Confidential Informants in New Jersey. 
A report commissioned by the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey in partnership with the Criminal 
Law Reform Project of the American Civil Liberties Union. (Newark, NJ: American Civil Liberties Union of New 
Jersey, 2011). 
 
10 See for example, the journalistic account of the criminal career of one of the UK’s most notorious organized 
crime individuals: T. Barnes, R. Elias and P Walsh, Cocky: the Rise and Fall of Curtis Warren, Britain’s Biggest 
Drugs Baron, (Bury: Milo Books, 2000). By way of alternative perspective, Graham Johnson, in his book Powder 
Wars: The Supergrass Who brought Down Britain’s Biggest Drug Dealers (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 
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It is in response to such harms that statutory regimes have been enacted in various 
jurisdictions. But the law is sometimes a blunt instrument and often is intended to work indirectly 
(not requiring virtue per se but relying, rather, on the threat of sanction to deter potential wrong-
doers).  Sometimes, as Kleinig has observed, moral limits are crossed before legal limits are 
reached.11
 
  The law cannot always accommodate ethical nuance. The community needs to be able to 
trust law enforcement agencies to operate properly on behalf of citizens. Using members of the 
community to report covertly on their families and associates has the potential to undermine 
seriously not only these individual social relationships but also the relationship between community 
and police. For that reason, and because the relationship between informer and police is so 
complex, it is of value to consider both the ethical framework within which  informing operates and 
whether, as agents of the police, informers when acting as such assume any professional obligations 
inherent in the police role. 
 
 
Morally problematic issues at the institutional level 
Policing is an institutional activity essential to peaceful society which, paradoxically, is 
facilitated by three kinds of conduct each of which is a species of prima facie moral harm. The first is 
coercion (constraining individual liberty through arrest, search, seizure); the second, deception 
(undermining trust through use of informers, undercover officers); and the third, surveillance 
(intrusion of privacy by various mechanisms). 12
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2005), provides a journalistic biography of Paul Grimes, the informer who provided information about Curtis 
Warren to the authorities.. 
   Such individual harms can be morally justified in 
 
11 Kleinig, Ethics of Policing, 135. 
 
12 Seumas Miller, The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
263. 
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defined circumstances on the basis that they form conduct the purpose of which is to protect 
otherwise vulnerable individuals from the actions of those who have either not assimilated or have 
actively rejected the social norms of any given society. Within this context, those about whom 
information is covertly collected and passed to the police are rendered more exposed to police 
coercive action as a consequence of the information being passed: armed with such information the 
authorities have a basis on which to act which they previously did not possess.  The persons about 
whom the police now have information are deceived to the extent that they are not aware that the 
information is being passed to the police by the informer. The informer abuses the trust of the 
person informed against: only because the informer is trusted, or even merely accepted, does the 
individual informed against associate with the informer. The moral harm of this deception and 
betrayal of trust can be outweighed in a policing institutional context. Justification for such methods 
is derived from the moral purpose of policing and the collective good it seeks: “the protection of 
fundamental moral rights - specifically justifiably enforceable (aggregate) moral rights - is a collective 
good to which the members of the community have a joint right, and it is the central and most 
important collective end of police work”. 13  From this proposition the argument moves on to Miller 
and Blackler’s proposed moral theory of policing in which “harmful and normally immoral methods 
are on occasion necessary in order to realise the fundamental end of policing, namely the protection 
of (justifiably enforceable) moral rights”.14
 
 This over-arching moral theory of policing thus provides 
an account within which, if the police are to fulfil their proper institutional purpose, occasional 
recourse to otherwise immoral methods is required.  
If policing as a social institution, including its occasional use of otherwise morally harmful 
methods, is morally justifiable then it must follow that those employed as police officers, to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
13 Miller, Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, 250.  
 
14 Seamus Miller and John Blackler, Ethical Issues in Policing (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) 26. 
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extent that their actions are intended to deliver the purpose of policing, are subject to the moral 
theory of policing. If informing is to be included amongst the otherwise morally harmful methods 
upon which policing may, as circumstances dictate, justifiably rely, then it is necessary to go beyond 
police officers and staff and to include the actions of informers (when acting as such) within the 
moral theory of policing also. To deny this proposition is to deny that informing is legitimate as a 
method of facilitating the policing purpose. Although informers are not police officers, when acting 
as informers these individuals are helping to fulfil the purpose of policing and to that extent their 
actions can be considered within the scope of the moral theory of policing. 15
 
 
The integrity of the institutional purpose is protected by the specification, usually in statute, 
of circumstances in which it is permissible to use such methods. Comparative consideration of the 
various covert investigation governance regimes operating in different jurisdictions is too broad a 
topic to be attempted here but in common, albeit to varying degrees, such regimes will be informed 
by the sorts of criteria that distinguish the circumstances in which recourse to otherwise immoral 
tactics can be justified. This provides the basis for identifying a detailed ethic of informing within the 
overall moral theory of policing that has been adopted for the purposes of this paper. 
 
The use of informers will be morally justified when certain criteria are present together.  
Firstly, the proposed use of informers must be consistent with the general moral theory of policing. 
Secondly, there must exist reasonable suspicion that the suspect about whom information is to be 
gathered has committed or is going to commit a crime. Where ongoing or planned criminality is 
suspected it may be the case that information only an informer can provide will confirm the 
suspicion and therefore confirm the need for further investigation and intervention. It is equally 
possible that the information that only an informer could provide may in some cases demonstrate 
                                                          
15 The same line of argument could be made in support of the notion of ‘citizen’s arrest’; the claim on which 
rests, for example, the moral legitimacy of a store detective detaining a customer who has left the shop 
without paying for goods taken. 
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the suspicion to be unfounded or it may elaborate the contextual understanding to the extent that it 
becomes evident to the investigators that less intrusive or less coercive methods will suffice to bring 
intervention to a successful conclusion. 16  Thirdly, the crime must be of sufficient seriousness to 
warrant recourse to otherwise immoral methods. The moral rights of victims/potential victims to be 
protected from serious crime or to have such a crime investigated and prosecuted as fully as 
possible must, in the circumstances, outweigh the suspect’s moral rights to privacy. 17  Just as a right 
to privacy is not absolute, neither are all crimes sufficiently serious to warrant use of covert 
investigation methods. 18
 
 Fourthly, there should be no other, less morally harmful means of securing 
the required information. Deployment of an informer should, in relation to the specific piece of 
information sought, be the last resort. Fifthly, the specific piece of information sought by means of 
an informer must itself be significant to the investigation: significant, in these circumstances, being 
understood to mean that the investigation could not proceed or that no prosecution could be 
initiated, without the specific piece of information that the informer could provide. Information that 
is merely interesting rather than of significant use, desirable rather than essential and necessary, 
may not be sufficient in itself to meet this moral criterion. 
Together these criteria serve to identify when it is morally justifiable for an informer to do 
no more than pass information to the police. Where obtaining the desired information requires that 
the informer engages in the criminality in order to gather the information, the number of individual 
moral wrongs committed by the informer increase compounding the cumulative moral harm. In such 
circumstances the informer is not only deceiving the suspect but is participating in conduct that 
                                                          
16 To be clear: there must first exist a reasonable suspicion of criminality. The fact that informer deployment 
subsequently discloses exculpatory rather than incriminating information does not invalidate that element of 
moral justification provided by this criterion if the original suspicion was reasonable in the circumstances. 
 
17 See Seamus Miller, John Blackler and Andrew Alexandra, Police Ethics (Hook: Waterside Press, 2006), 258-
262 for a discussion of privacy in this context. 
 
18 Whilst too large an issue to be discussed here, seriousness in this context is understood to be a reflection of 
the harm caused (or likely to be caused) by the (planned) crime. 
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society, through its legislative assembly, has defined as criminal. Assuming that the given law is not 
itself immoral, committing crime is itself a moral harm. This in turn gives rise to a further moral 
harm: committing crime in order to prosecute crime undermines the very purpose of the criminal 
justice system and the integrity of its actors and agencies. Nevertheless it can be envisaged that the 
five criteria above could, if the circumstances were sufficient, provide the starting point for an 
account which could provide moral justification for participation in a crime by an informer in order 
to secure significant information that could not otherwise be obtained about serious crime.  
 
To arrive at such an account, to the initial five criteria identified above must be added a 
sixth; that the nature of the informer’s participation must be both minor within the context of the 
specific crime and also necessary and therefore unavoidable (non-participation being morally 
preferable to participation). For example: it might be justifiable for an informer to supply or perhaps 
even drive the getaway car in which persons planning to commit an armed robbery of a bank with 
their identities disguised, intended to flee the scene. This might be the only means by which 
investigators could confirm who actually took part in the robbery. But it would only be justifiable if 
there was no realistic option for the authorities to intervene pre-emptively and frustrate the robbery 
before it was committed. This constraint might exist where such pre-emption would expose, 
compromise and therefore possibly endanger the informer. A seventh necessary criterion when 
contemplating informer participation in a planned crime is that the specific planned crime will 
happen anyway, whether or not the informer participates.  In other words, the informer’s non-
participation will not of itself be sufficient to frustrate the crime and so prevent the moral and 
physical harms to which its commission will give rise. 
 
Such moral ambiguity is reflected in law. In some Australian jurisdictions, in order to avoid 
the adverse consequence of having evidence declared improperly obtained and so excluded from 
trial, statutory provision exists for the prior authorization (and in some circumstances even 
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retrospective authorization) of criminal participation by informers or undercover officers. 19  Statute 
law in England is silent on this issue but case law has defined parameters which, without going so far 
as to offer immunity from prosecution, define when minor participation has been accepted and 
those involved may not be proceeded against.20
 
 
The above criteria apply in circumstances that fall short of entrapment: the most morally 
ambiguous use of informers.  Miller et al offer five criteria that should be met for conduct they 
define as entrapment to be morally justified. 21 In addition to the criteria of reasonable suspicion and 
no feasible alternative means discussed above, when the circumstances could give rise to 
entrapment Miller et al propose that three further criteria should apply. The suspect should be 
ordinarily presented with the kind of opportunity that typically exists: police should not specifically 
create the circumstances for the crime to be committed. The inducement that entices the suspect 
should be nothing more than would typically be available to the suspect and one that an ordinary, 
law-abiding citizen would be expected to resist. Finally, for the use of an informer or undercover 
officer in such circumstances to be morally justifiable, it must be clear that the suspect not only had 
a disposition to commit such crime but also had a standing intention to commit such crime.  In other 
words, the suspect should not merely be of a character more inclined to succumb to criminal 
temptation than to resist: it must be probable that the suspect will commit crime whenever 
opportunity presents itself. 22
 
 
                                                          
19 Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 (NSW), s.14. 
 
20 R v Birtles [1969] 1 WLR 1047. 
 
21 Miller et al, Police Ethics, 263-4. 
 
22 It is assumed that such offenders act not on irrational impulse but upon a rational choice in which a 
determination is made on the basis of weighing up personal gains against the likely cost (including the 
likelihood of detection, conviction and punishment) of committing the crime. See  Derek Cornish and Ronald 
Clarke, The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986) 
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Distinction can be drawn between a proactive ‘sting’ or ‘tethered goat’ scenario in which a 
criminal opportunity is presented and those availing themselves of it will be prosecuted (which gives 
rise to entrapment concerns),23    and a reactive ‘test purchase’ scenario, in which intelligence has 
disclosed ongoing criminality and the deployment of an undercover operative is necessary in order 
to secure a specific element of the chain of evidence upon which a prosecution will depend. 24  An 
example would be that of the street drug dealer, whose disposition and standing intention could be 
demonstrated through surveillance.  Surveillance alone is not sufficient for a conviction because to 
satisfy criteria of proof at trial it will be necessary to secure evidence of exactly what is being sold. 
Arresting the dealer’s customers identified through the surveillance may result in such evidence 
being obtained but drug-users may not present themselves as credible witnesses at trial. 25
 
  Adept 
cross-examination may well ignite reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury thus undermining the 
prosecution. In such circumstances the deployment of an undercover officer to purchase the drugs 
(itself a crime) to establish a continuous and auditable chain of evidence from dealer to forensic 
laboratory to trial, can be morally justified (even though a series of such purchases may be necessary 
to prove a specific charge relating to continuing or repeated behaviour) using the criteria discussed 
in this section. 
The moral theory of policing provides an over-arching framework within which institutional 
reliance upon the tactic of informing can, on occasions, be morally justified. Within the context of 
any given institution this conduct needs to be managed. Management mechanisms (including 
                                                          
23 This scenario is akin to integrity-testing of the public rather than criminal investigation of specific suspects. 
Claims that it is a legitimate means of fulfilling the proper purpose of policing are undermined by the objection 
that, in these particular circumstances, no crime (and therefore no moral harm offending public morality) 
would have occurred but for the police use of proactive methods. 
 
24 An undercover operative in this scenario need not be a police officer - for example where the test purchase 
is of alcohol or cigarettes being sold to a person younger than the age at which alcohol or tobacco purchase is 
permitted. The use of juveniles in such circumstances raises additional moral issues beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
25 Given that arrest is itself a moral harm, it is not conclusive in the circumstances considered here that it is 
morally justifiable as a means of securing (coercing?) persons to act as prosecution witnesses at trial. 
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statutory authorization regimes) geared towards accountability for resource allocation and holding 
staff to account professionally will not of themselves provide additional or alternative moral 
justification for the use of informers. (That which is lawful and accords with policy nevertheless may 
not be moral; that which is possible and feasible may not be necessary.) But such mechanisms ought 
properly to guard against unjustifiable moral harm. 
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Morally problematic issues in the management of informers 
Current accountability regimes governing the use of informers have two common features: 
prior authorization of deployment, and post facto reporting on contact between the police officer(s) 
handling the informer and the informer. These two species of mechanisms recommend themselves 
on the basis of smooth fit with administrative practice and through consistency with governance 
regimes established for the use of other policing tactics and powers. 26  In seeking to achieve and 
maximise transparency (to the extent consistent with maintaining informer and handler safety) 
these mechanisms nevertheless do not encompass how police handlers and informers should 
conduct their own relationship and the business of informing. This lacuna exists because current 
accountability mechanisms are founded upon direct supervision of paper- or computer-based 
bureaucratic methods, and there is no scope for any form of direct supervision of informers once 
they are active in the surveillance arena. 27
 
  Making authorization conditional can create safeguard 
criteria the breaching of which will void the authorization (thus possibly rendering informing conduct 
unlawful in turn triggering a disciplinary investigation, or a criminal investigation, or action to 
remedy an abuse of due process, or any permutation of these interventions) but this at best 
provides a negative ‘shall not’ approach rather than a more positive ‘shall’ approach to guiding 
informer and handler decisions about conduct. 
                                                          
26 Considerable variation exists between and within jurisdictions as to what species of official may confer prior 
authorization. In England and Wales, for example, the Secretary of State for Home Affairs is the authorizing 
officer for telephone interception, whilst chief constables and independent surveillance commissioners 
participate in a two-stage process for the authorization of intrusive surveillance. Directed surveillance (general 
observations or the use of informers) is authorized by a Police Superintendent. Similar tactics in other 
jurisdictions require judicial rather than self- or administrative authorization. 
 
27 There is scope for senior officers to supervise contact between informers and handlers when tasking or 
debriefing informers. But deploying an officer to accompany and supervise the informer when the latter is 
acting in that capacity would arouse suspicion on the part of the suspect and so compromise and endanger the 
informer. 
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Consider the process involved in police deployment of an informer against a suspect. The 
relevant statutory threshold is met28: the suspected criminality is sufficiently serious to warrant 
consideration of such a tactic; 29 there is no other feasible and less intrusive means of obtaining the 
desired intelligence or evidence; and the proposed tactic is lawful.  Meeting statutory governance 
criteria creates the circumstances in which authorization to deploy may lawfully be given all things 
being equal. The police will subsequently record the following: details of the meeting at which the 
informer is briefed and deployed; and details of the debriefing meeting following deployment at 
which the informer will relay to the police what took place during deployment. Such records provide 
a form of transparency amenable to subsequent review by managers or independent ombudsmen.30
 
 
This system addresses general moral justification (to the extent that such can be expressed 
through statute law) for the fact that the police are making institutional recourse to the use of 
informers, an otherwise morally unjustified intrusion against individual privacy and autonomy. But it 
offers no guidance or benchmarks about how informers should conduct themselves so as to 
minimise moral harm to others during their deployment, and indeed minimise the “moral cost” of 
the fact of the deployment itself.31
                                                          
28 In England and Wales the relevant statutory thresholds for different categories of surveillance including the 
use of informers are defined in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Police Act 1997, both 
as amended. The architecture of these Acts, in turn, is strongly influenced by the Human Rights Act 1998 which 
enshrines many of the values protected by the criteria outline in the first section of this paper. 
   Even if the moral theory of policing provides an account within 
 
29 Seriousness of a crime for the purposes of prior authorization of a specific tactic or engagement of a specific 
power (e.g. arrest) is often defined in terms of maximum prison sentence. In England and Wales for instance 
general surveillance (termed ‘directed surveillance’ in the statute and which includes informer deployment) 
may be applied in the investigation of any offence but certain forms of intrusive surveillance are restricted to 
investigations into offences conviction for which would carry a maximum sentence of three or more years in 
prison: ss. 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, and 81 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The police general power of 
arrest is triggered if the suspected offence would, on first conviction, attract a possible maximum sentence of 
five years imprisonment: s.24 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
 
30 If safety considerations permit an informer might be equipped with a covert recording device but this merely 
facilitates post facto transparency through record-keeping. It does not offer a means of direct supervision in 
the whilst active in the surveillance arena. 
 
31 John Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 130. 
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which informer participation as a tactical tool can be (exceptionally) justified, how is the extent and 
nature of justifiable informer participation in any given planned crime to be determined? What will 
be justifiable may depend upon the exact nature of the planned crime. Who is to make this 
determination?  Intuitively the notion presents itself that the decision-maker should be a senior 
officer independent of the investigation yet such distance carries with it the risk that those seeking 
authority to deploy will provide selective intelligence upon which the decision-maker is called upon 
to determine the approved strategy.32   Informers, handlers, investigators and managers may all 
have different views on what might be justifiable in any given circumstance and it may be difficult 
for outcome-focused practitioners to omit expediency when calculating the moral equation.33
 
   
Informer participation can be accommodated conceptually within the moral theory of policing but it 
does not follow that it will necessarily ever be morally right for police to ask - let alone obligate - 
informers to participate in a crime.  
Any management system based on policies and procedures is at risk from the possibility that 
those who should abide by such systems choose not to. Police officers prioritising practical efficacy 
and the achievement of results over procedure may subvert the management process in order to cut 
corners whilst still seeking to fulfil the proper purpose of policing.34 Other individuals may subvert 
the systems for personal gain. 35
                                                          
32 A further deception vulnerability in an arena, as will be seen in the next section, replete with deceit. 
 Where an organization uses a dedicated and exclusive informer-
handling unit, investigators outside that unit may nevertheless privately recruit their own informers 
for professional gain thus evading all systems for managing the informing relationship. To the extent 
 
33 That is not to deny that economic considerations may be pertinent to some moral judgements. 
 
34 The investigator prioritizing pragmatism over procedure may be doing so genuinely to achieve the proper 
ultimate purpose of policing or the individual may have his or her own personal perception of what the 
ultimate proper purpose should be. Either scenario gives rise to so-called noble cause corruption. 
 
35 Within any organization using informers, access to informers, the information produced by informers, and 
information about the informers themselves are all assets capable of being exploited by corrupt staff. Mark 
Standen’s case, fn 9 above, is one such example. 
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that any management process can be corrupted, the management of informers can be corrupted. 
Assuming the management systems and their ultimate purpose to be morally sound, corruption of 
such systems or persons using them is a prima facie moral wrong. Corruption of a system (and/or its 
actors) intended to manage justifiable utilization of an otherwise morally harmful conduct is thus 
morally wrong at a number of levels. 
 
Regulation and governance of the management of informers reinforces (through defined 
operating standards) the moral justification for institutional recourse to such methods. Informer 
management in and of itself does not provide a separate moral justification for informing although it 
does provide a mechanism for minimizing the immoral use of informers. Minimizing the immoral use 
of informers does not, in and of itself, guarantee that the informers and their police handlers will, as 
individuals, act in a morally justifiable way when engaged in the process of informing. Inculcating 
greater awareness of moral problems to be minimized and managed might be achieved through 
reference to professional obligations. Professional obligations in relation to informing and the 
management of informers (if such exist alongside the general ethical framework proposed above) 
must be founded upon an understanding of the moral issues confronting individuals in the daily 
arena of informing. 
 
 
 
Morally problematic issues at the individual level 
At the individual level moral issues arising from the act of informing divide into two arenas: 
informer moral behaviour and handler moral behaviour. The latter can be further sub-divided 
because of the different operational environments in which police may manage the use of 
informers. Police officers working in an exclusive and dedicated informer-handling unit are tasked 
through intelligence-management processes with obtaining specific items of information with which 
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to inform the intelligence picture in support of any investigation team. Organizationally separated 
and, where good practice is followed, physically removed from the actual investigation team, 
specialist informer-handlers do not have the same personal vested interest in the outcome of an 
investigation as does the detective or street patrol officer cultivating his or her own informers. 36
 
 The 
discussion that follows considers first informer morality and then handler morality. 
 
Informers 
Where an informer (X) provides information about a suspect (S) covertly to the police (P) the 
tactic is morally justified at the institutional level within the general moral theory of policing where 
qualifying criteria are met. X will be in an exclusive position to provide the desired information about 
S because they are associates.37
 
   X will either already be in possession of the desired information by 
virtue of past association with S, or else current association will provide the means by which X can 
discover the desired information. For example: for the purpose of examining telephone records P 
needs to know the telephone number of the mobile phone used by S. X may already know this 
because X and S communicate by phone. But if X does not know the number, X’s association with S 
provides a context within which X plausibly can ask S for the number. 
It is assumed that S would not approve the passing of such information to P because P will 
use the information to investigate and prosecute S. It is assumed that S would consider and may well 
                                                          
36 In the United Kingdom police forces are encouraged to adopt as good practice the operating model of the 
Dedicated Source Unit (DSU) for the handling and management of informers which provides a sterile corridor 
between investigator and informer, an organizational structure seen as of particular benefit in minimizing risks 
of investigator/informer corruption. Within this operating model individual investigators do not recruit or 
handle their own informers. This operating model is encouraged by the statutory authorization regime for the 
management of covert human intelligence sources set out in Part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000. Whilst the Act does not mandate the use of DSUs, the DSU model provides the most economic and 
efficient use of resources in order to meet statutory requirements. 
 
37 Taken to include family, friends or colleagues. 
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take retributive action against X were S to discover X was passing such information to P. It is 
assumed that were S to discover X were passing information to P, S would also take action to 
frustrate the investigation being undertaken by P. These assumptions are considered reasonable 
based on the reported experiences of police (handlers and undercover officers) and informers. 38
 
  
Such an environment provides justification for the use of deception to protect X and the integrity of 
P’s investigation.  
By not telling S that information is being passed to P, X is deceiving S. The deception of S by 
X is morally wrong because it undermines the trust on which their social interaction is based. This 
moral wrong is outweighed by the justification provided by the moral theory of policing discussed 
above: that deception by or on behalf of the police can be justified in certain circumstances. 39
 
  An 
additional justification arises from the fact that secrecy, and therefore deception to maintain such 
secrecy, is necessary to protect X from retribution at the hands of S. (In the context of managing 
informers tactical use of deception can be posited as an occupational health and safety strategy!) 
This line of argument can be used to extend the moral justification that can be argued for P 
to encompass the actions of X from which P will benefit at the expense of S. But such an extension 
does not take into account X’s motivation and purpose.40
                                                          
38 See, for example, Andrew Boyd, The Informers: a Chilling Account of the Supergrasses of Northern Ireland 
(Dublin: Mercier Press, 1984) 23; and generally, T. Barnes, R. Elias and P Walsh, Cocky: the Rise and Fall of 
Curtis Warren, Britain’s Biggest Drugs Baron, (Bury: Milo Books, 2000); Graham Johnson Powder Wars: The 
Supergrass Who Brought Down Britain’s Biggest Drug Dealers (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2005). 
   It is conceivable that X is motivated by a 
sense of civic duty, in which case X’s deception could be justified by extension of the moral theory of 
 
39 Justification of such deception on behalf of policing assumes that informers can be properly encompassed 
within the moral theory of policing adopted here. 
 
40 Graham Johnson, Powder Wars: The Supergrass Who Brought Down Britain’s Biggest Drug Dealers 
(Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing) recounts the circumstances in which Paul Grimes came to be of potential 
value as an informer and came to be motivated to inform against Curtis Warren, the richest organized crime 
figure in the UK. This is a particular example of informing at a very serious level of criminality and thus may not 
be typical. Little appears to have been done in the way of academic research into informer motivation. 
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policing. But the author’s practitioner experience suggests that such public-spirited motivation 
amongst informers is rare. Reward and/or revenge, anecdotally, are more common motivations for 
informers. Neither has any strong claim that over-rides the prima facie moral harm inherent in 
informing. 
 
  If X is informing P about S as an act of revenge against S for some perceived or actual wrong 
caused to X (or another) by S, then X’s purpose is to cause harm to S: a moral wrong motivated by 
malevolence. The fact that the moral harm likely to be suffered by S at the hands of P (for example, 
arrest, conviction, punishment) can be justified within the moral theory of policing does not 
overcome moral objections to X’s conduct and motivation in these circumstances. Indeed, the 
immorality of X’s malevolence towards S is compounded by the fact that X is, in essence, 
manipulating P (both as an institution and its actors in their own right and as a community resource) 
to cause harm to S. 
 
Alternatively X may entertain no particular malevolence towards S but may instead be 
motivated solely by personal reward.  This can be further complicated by the circumstances in which 
X comes to agree to supply P with information concerning S, to which consideration this paper 
returns in detail below [pp.23-27].  Suffice it here to consider straightforward circumstances in which 
X provides information to P and in return receives cash for doing so. In this account the information 
about S is a commodity to be traded.  An objection could be raised on the basis that S will suffer 
harm as a consequence of such an exchange and that no one should be rewarded for causing harm 
to another.  But this simple account would have to be qualified; otherwise neither the salaries of 
police officers nor the offering and paying of public rewards for information leading to the arrest and 
conviction of wanted persons could be morally justified.  Reward for information provided also runs 
to heart of the trial process when witnesses who would otherwise self-incriminate are offered 
immunity from prosecution for testifying and defendants receive discounted sentences which take 
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into account either guilty pleas or information subsequently provided to the police in relation to 
other matters. 41 Unappealing as it is, trading information is at least desirable, possibly even 
essential , 42
 
  for the better prosecution of serious crime and such exchange can be accommodated 
within the account provided by the general moral theory of policing. 
If solely motivated by reward it is open to X to trade not with P but with S. X has two 
possible commodities to ‘sell’ in this scenario. The first is high risk and concerns the information X 
knows about S. X could demand reward from S for not passing the information on to P. This is 
blackmail and in the circumstances considered here, no obvious claim presents itself that overcomes 
the moral wrong of blackmail.  Extorting money from someone in exchange for not passing on 
incriminating information about them has the effect of the blackmailer enslaving the person from 
whom money is demanded. Enslavement denies, or at least unreasonably constrains, individual 
autonomy.43
                                                          
41 See for example the Crime (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ss.22-23; also Serious Organised Crime 
and Police Act 2005 (UK) ss71-75. 
   Nor is this the only moral harm arising from such conduct. In these circumstances X is 
knowingly subverting the process of criminal law enforcement, causing a wider moral harm to the 
community. X may not be aware that information he or she knows is of value to P until P asks for it. 
X could then deceive P by denying access to such information whilst at the same time using the fact 
of P’s interest as the basis for extorting money from S in exchange for silence. Again, beyond the fact 
that S is not exposed to enforcement action in such circumstances, no obvious moral justification 
presents itself and the absence of official harm to S is outweighed by the immorality of the 
blackmail. 
 
42 For a policy discussion of such issues from a UK perspective see section 6.3.2, One Step Ahead: A 21st Century 
Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime, Cm 6167, (London: The Stationery Office, 2004). 
 
43 Accepting for the purpose here, Raz’s analysis of autonomy in which three conceptual elements are 
distinguished: an appropriate mental capability to make and informed choice; an adequate range of 
reasonable options from which to choose; and independence from coercion. Blackmail denies the latter two. 
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), chapter 14. 
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The second aspect of information trade in which X could engage with S is that of the double 
agent.  Simply by asking X to provide information about S, P reveals to X official interest in S. 
Sophisticated informer management should seek to minimize the risk of detailed disclosure in such 
circumstances but it is open to X - and therefore a constant vulnerability for P - for X to alert S about 
such investigative interest and to request reward from S for doing so. X and S could agree to play 
along with P’s request in order to try and elicit further intelligence about P’s interest and awareness 
through the nature of P’s requests. Here X has the opportunity to present the trade to S as a service. 
Such a presentation looks superficially different from explicit blackmail, but the potential for 
blackmail is evident and in determining how this scenario plays out much depends on the symmetry 
or asymmetry of the power relationship between S and X. Although S benefits from this deception 
by X, that individual good is insufficient to outweigh wider moral objections that remain: namely 
that the collective good of protecting community moral rights is not served by this use of deception. 
The benefit S receives merely facilitates S’s continued criminality (a moral harm against the 
community) and the deception against P is morally wrong undermining, as it does, P’s protection of 
victims and the community through the protection of justifiably enforceable moral rights. 
 
In the circumstance above X (with or without S’s collaboration) sets out deliberately to 
deceive P, doing so motivated by personal, private gain at the same time undermining the rule of 
law. It is open to X to agree to supply information to P and then only supply false or misleading 
information that will, intentionally or not, confound and frustrate P’s investigations. X’s potential for 
reward in pursuing such a strategy is likely to be short-lived: once P recognises that no information 
of value is coming from X, P will likely end the relationship. To the extent that X’s actions undermine 
the legitimate rule of law,44
                                                          
44 Assuming the relevant law is morally sound. 
 such deception is not morally justified even if, for instance, X is able to 
put the reward to some morally good purpose such as buying food for X’s children. Deliberate 
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deception of P by X may be justifiable in circumstances where the law being enforced is morally 
wrong or where the police are structured and tasked not within the community service constabulary 
model but along the suppressive Gestapo or Stasi models. Deception of P by X will not be justifiable 
in a liberal democracy operating a criminal justice system according to due process principles. 
 
The extent to which police use of informers is justified within a liberal democracy operating 
a criminal justice system according to due process principles does not depend solely upon the 
motivation of the informer.  As the discussion above illustrates, the varied motivations of informers 
may significantly affect the value of the informing relationship to the police, and through their 
agency its value to society at large. To the extent that the relationship must provide information of 
significant value to an investigation if all the criteria for moral justification of informing proposed 
above are to be met, then informer motivation and conduct can seriously undermine the moral 
justification of informing. But informer use of deception and treatment of informer product is not 
the only moral arena at the individual level. In this interaction the other half of the relationship is the 
police handler who has day-to-day contact with the informer.  As previously noted the handler may 
either be an investigator operating individually to recruit and manage personal informers or the 
handler could be a specialist officer whose role it is solely to manage informers as an organizational 
resource and who has no investigative responsibilities beyond tasking informers with missions to fill 
identified intelligence gaps and then relaying the acquired intelligence back to the requesting 
investigator in a form suitably sanitized to protect the source.  It is to this aspect of the informing 
process that this discussion now turns. 
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Handlers 
The handler collaborates with the informer in deception against the suspect. Although the 
informer is the individual who actively deceives the suspect (without the handler being present at 
the time), the handler is complicit in the deception because the informer, even if motivated by 
private gain, is operating also for the benefit of (and usually at the behest of) the handler who needs 
the deception to be executed in order to achieve the desired end. In undermining the trust upon 
which social relations are based, such deception is morally wrong. To the extent that it is employed 
in furthering the protection of justifiably enforceable victim and community moral rights deception 
in these circumstances can be morally justified.  
 
Where exclusive informer-handling units manage informers as an organization resource on 
behalf of all investigators, it would not be unusual for officers so deployed to operate with assumed 
identities when interacting with the informers.45
                                                          
45 Where investigators recruit and manage their own informers it is more likely that they will first encounter 
the potential informer in circumstances in which the officer’s real identity will be known or become known to 
the informer through the investigator acting in his or her official capacity. Where specialist informer-handling 
units are used there is the opportunity from the outset for officers to utilise alternative professional identities 
as a means of protecting their true identities. 
  Using a false identity when recruiting and 
managing an informer is a form of deception and must therefore be justified if the prima facie moral 
objection is to be overcome. Trust as a foundation of social interaction is closely related to accepting 
the identity of the person in whom trust, however qualified, is invested for the purpose of 
interaction. The informer, when dealing with the suspect, deceives the suspect as to the ulterior 
purpose of their interaction.  S knows who X is but not the exact nature of what X is doing.  The 
relationship between a handler and an informer at best is likely to operate on the basis of qualified 
trust rather than upon an unconditional trust such as might exist between friends. (Indeed, were it 
to become a friendship rather than a working relationship risks of corruption would arise.) Where 
handlers protect themselves using false identities for operational purposes, is this use of false 
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identity morally wrong? On one account, any form of deceit can be said to be morally wrong but on 
another account deceit can be morally justified in certain circumstances, within the moral theory of 
policing. The informer knows what the handler represents and, to the extent that P reveals the 
purpose of the investigation, what P is doing. The fact that the handler is known to colleagues as 
‘John’ but to informers as ‘Mick’ is not apparently a significant deceit in these circumstances because 
trust and identity are not as crucial to the X/P relationship as these elements are to the X/S 
relationship. The X/P relationship is characterized more by function than social identity.  The 
informer understands that the police will use the information provided against the suspect. The 
informer’s deceit of the suspect is of greater moral significance than P’s deception of X in using a 
false identity (for which a specific moral justification can be claimed - preventing compromise of P’s 
safety and integrity - alongside the justification derived from the moral theory of policing).  
 
In the event that the suspect discovers what the informer is doing, the informer is at risk of 
(violent) retribution from the suspect. The suspect may wish to extend this retribution against the 
informer into vengeance against the handler with the intention of deterring future investigative and 
enforcement interventions. 46  To this extent both informer and handler are dependent upon each 
other not disclosing their purpose and so compromising their own and each other’s individual safety. 
The handler can use a false identity to reinforce his or her personal protection from such a risk. 
Handlers are entitled to take measures to reduce risks to themselves and so work in the safest 
feasible environment (recourse to subterfuge being inherently and intrinsically risky and dangerous): 
organizational safe operating procedures policy may well impose such a risk reduction measure on 
handlers.47
                                                          
46 Open-source intelligence can be exploited just as easily by suspects seeking to compromise police officers 
and their families as it can be by investigators seeking to discover more information about a suspect. 
   That the informer has no such avenue of additional protection does not itself make it 
 
47 Where the assumption of a false identity is indeed organizational policy it is assumed that the procedures 
will include processes by which the handlers remain fully accountable to supervisors for their actions. Where 
the handler just assumes a false identity of their own volition such conduct reduces their amenability to 
accountability and in doing so the handler may be practising a deceit against their own management. 
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morally wrong for the handler to utilise such measures but it does perhaps increase the onus on the 
handler to protect the informer because the latter is the more vulnerable for not having that option. 
Such a deception - the use of a false identity - exercised by the handler against the informer (even 
though the informer is acting on behalf of the handler) is considered morally repugnant on the basis 
that the officer is lying about his or her identity and identity is key to any relationship.  But the use of 
such a lie can be morally justified to the extent that it is necessary to facilitate the morally justifiable 
purpose of policing as an institution: the protection of justifiably enforceable victim and community 
moral rights. To that extent moral justification for the use of false identities by handlers is based on 
complex considerations and is not prima facie self-evident. 
 
It has been argued above that informing as an activity engages the three morally wrong 
behaviours that, in the appropriate circumstances (usually defined in law) are necessary to facilitate 
effective policing. Informing is a form of surveillance (and so an invasion of privacy); it functions 
through deception, which has occupied the bulk of the consideration above; and through the 
recruitment of potential informers it may involve the use of coercion or the exploitation of coercive 
circumstance, to persuade the potential informer to co-operate. 
 
Informers can be recruited in a number of ways. They can, of their own volition, meet freely 
to volunteer their services to the police.  Such recruitment circumstances will probably be based on 
consensual collaboration: X, albeit perhaps motivated by a desire for financial reward, freely offering 
or agreeing to supply information to P. 48
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
  In this case no question of P (ab)using X seems to arise. 
There is no coercion present in this scenario.   
48 To the best of his knowledge, uniquely amongst his colleagues the present author and his team of specialist 
handlers managed one informer (with a long history of serious criminality) who never sought reward of any 
description and refused rewards unilaterally offered by the police. This particular informer volunteered his 
services to the police in an unsolicited approach, claiming a private, altruistic motivation. This was sufficiently 
unusual to generate suspicion as to the informer’s true motive; specifically the suspicion that the informer was 
providing information against criminal market competitors in order to monopolize whatever criminal market 
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Not infrequently, it is the fact that the potential informer is a criminal - their criminal 
associations rendering them valuable as informers - and accordingly, recruitment could take place in 
circumstances in which the (potential) informer is subject to law enforcement intervention likely to 
result in adverse consequence to the (potential) informer.  An offer, made in the cell-block, of police 
bail as an alternative to remand in custody is an offer of a ‘reward in kind’ that is made in 
circumstances of significant vulnerability for X. The informer, under arrest on another matter, is 
required to make a choice in circumstances of very restricted autonomy with the real possibility of 
immediate adverse consequence in the event of non-cooperation. 49
 
  In this scenario the 
circumstances in which X is approached by police are coercive in character.  
Nor is the character of the circumstance any less coercive if, whilst sitting in the police cell, it 
is the potential informer rather than the police officer who broaches the possibility of informing.  X, 
in order to curry favour with the investigators, may offer to act as an informer before being asked. 
Whilst this has the appearance of being voluntary, such an apparently unsolicited offer is 
nevertheless still made in coercive circumstances: X is offering to be an informer not because he or 
she would have done so anyway, but because he or she is seeking mitigation of prevailing personal 
disadvantage. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
enterprise the informer was engaged in. The informer was made subject to various covert intelligence 
operations which tended to corroborate the informer’s claim to have retired from active serious criminality. 
 
49 A not unusual arena for informer recruitment is the police custody suite or cell block. X is arrested under 
investigation for an offence. During X’s period of arrest and detention by P X may be invited to act as an 
informer in relation to other and/or future matters. Either explicitly or implicitly the impression may be 
conveyed to X that P will not oppose bail (release from custody pending trial) in the matter for which X has 
been arrested if X agrees to act as an informer. The alternative to bail is being remanded in custody until trial. 
In such circumstances X may form the impression that becoming an informer will buy immediate freedom 
from custody. In addition, or alternatively: X, knowing that conviction in his case will result in a prison 
sentence, may choose to act as an informer in order that a plea for mitigation can be entered before sentence. 
In England and Wales such pleas are entered with the judge via a letter from the police, the existence of which 
is known only to P and X, and must be kept secret from X’s lawyer: Kingsley Hyland, ‘Texts - rewarding the 
public spirited defendant or a recipe for abuse?’ [2006] Covert Policing Review: 87-97.; a further use of 
deception even though P and X would counter that in following this procedure they are observing procedures 
formally set out for the administration of trials.  
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Coercion, or the exploitation of coercive circumstance, is morally harmful. Can it ever be 
morally justified? Is the manipulation of an individual of a different moral order from the covert 
manipulation of information?   The latter can be justified in certain circumstances within Miller’s 
moral theory of policing. Can the former? Where circumstances of coercion have induced the 
(potential) informer to co-operate, the absence of unfettered willingness on the part of the informer 
taints the moral worth of the recruitment notwithstanding that it is claimed ultimately to be for the 
benefit of the morally legitimate purpose of policing.50  A fine but nonetheless significant distinction 
can be drawn between the manipulation of an individual to the advantage of ‘the police’, and the 
manipulation (covert acquisition and onward transmission) of information for the purposes of 
‘policing’. If, in the recruitment scenario, the informer is (or feels) not free to refuse to act as such, 
then he or she is subject to police exploitation: conduct which oversteps the line distinguishing what 
the police (on Miller’s normative account of institutional morality) are entitled to do (even if specific 
justification is required for otherwise morally wrong conduct) and that which they are not.51
 
 
Coercion is one of the morally problematic issues concerning informer recruitment. A 
second morally problematic area concerns recruitment of individuals as informers who hitherto have 
led lives free from reliance upon deception but whose innocent (or at least non-criminal) 
relationship to the suspect means that they are best placed to provide the information that cannot 
be provided by any less intrusive or less morally problematic means. 52
                                                          
50 An arrested potential informer unmoved by incarceration and unconcerned by the consequences of non-
compliance may well be persuaded to opt for co-operation rather than not on the basis (all other things being 
equal) that it is the more attractive of the alternatives available. But where detention is unduly influencing the 
judgement of the detainee, then coercion is at play. 
  Examples could include the 
 
51 The recruitment of informers and the use of informing as a tactic are distinguishable and thus require 
separate moral consideration. 
 
52 Whilst it is not unknown for individuals to commit crimes with the intention of being caught, it is assumed 
here that the majority of individuals who commit crimes would wish to evade detection and prosecution if 
they could, and would default to deception as one tactic in an overall strategy of evasion.  
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exploitation of a business relationship, informing thus infringing any obligations of professional 
confidentiality. An alternative scenario would involve a familial relationship; even to the extent that 
spouses are asked to inform against their partners or children against their parents. To the extent 
that informing undermines trust-based relationships (a prima facie moral harm), is the undermining 
of a biological relationship of a different moral order from that of a merely social relationship? Adult 
sexual abuse of a child is abhorrent regardless of whether the perpetrator is related to the victim or 
not. The vulnerability of the victim defines the awfulness at an objective level. Yet subjectively, 
moral repugnance (illustrated often at its most raw for example in media commentary53) seems 
greater when the offender is related to the victim. In such a scenario a particular bond of trust above 
and beyond the ordinary has been violated. In the adult world the law also recognises that certain 
relationships are held to be inviolate: many jurisdictions adhere to the principle that an individual 
cannot be compelled to give evidence against their spouse.54
 
  If the violation or infringement of such 
relationships is held to be more morally repugnant than the violation of non-familial relationships in 
relation to criminal activity, does not the same principle apply in the arena of informing? Or does the 
moral theory of policing overcome other objections in such circumstances?  To elaborate the 
dilemma: if the only person who can provide authorities with the information necessary to intervene 
successfully against a criminal causing serious harm to individuals or the community is the child of 
the offender, would it be morally wrong of the authorities not (to attempt) to recruit the child as an 
informer and not to use the information that the child could provide (because to do so would violate 
the familial/biological relationship, an objection that normally over-rides other considerations)?  
                                                          
53 One thinks, for instance, of the campaign run by the now defunct British newspaper The News of the World 
to name and shame paedophiles following the murder of schoolgirl Sarah Payne in July 2000: a campaign that 
ignited much violent and not infrequently misdirected vigilantism. See, for example, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1709708.htm, dated 16th December 2001, accessed 30th January 2012.  
 
54 Or at least can be compelled only in very limited circumstances.  
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If the moral theory of policing is sound - that otherwise immoral conduct can, in certain 
circumstances, be morally justified in order to secure the morally enforceable rights of victims or the 
community - then the use of child or spouse informers can, in specific circumstances, be justified. 
Trying to implement this normative principle into descriptive circumstance for the purpose of 
regulation and governance is where ethical theory meets with the practicalities of applied ethics. 55
 
 
Whether or not the utilization of children or spouses can be morally justified, there remains 
the problematic issue of whether recruitment of such informers can be justified. In instances where 
the spouse or child has, of their own volition, formed the opinion that the conduct of their relative is 
such as to demand intervention, and in consequence of this opinion the individual voluntarily offers 
their services to the authorities, then the issue becomes one of whether or not the investigators are 
morally justified in not acting on the information offered. Such circumstances seem to fall within the 
moral theory of policing.  
 
Where police become aware that a child or spouse may be in a position to provide the 
desired information but the child or spouse has not come forward to offer the information (and may 
not be aware that he or she is in a position to assist the authorities), then active and unsolicited 
recruitment is the only way forward. The investigators must make an approach to the potential 
informer and seek that individual’s assistance (and it may be that such an approach alerts the spouse 
or child to the family member’s criminality of which they were previously unaware). Unsolicited 
recruitment would involve the authorities deliberately undermining or corrupting a familial 
relationship which might otherwise not have been tainted in any way by the spouse’s or parent’s 
criminal conduct. It places the potential informer in the invidious position either of 
                                                          
55 For the way in which the regulatory regime extant in the jurisdiction of England and Wales seeks to deal with 
the issue of juvenile informers see paragraph 4.23 and Appendix A of the Covert Human Intelligence Sources 
Code of Practice, issued pursuant to s 71 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The governance 
response is to elevate responsibility for prior authorization to a more senior officer, without necessarily 
providing any additional counselling on the moral issues to be weighed.  
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betraying/deceiving, or appearing to betray/deceive, their relative (if the desired information is 
provided) or of acting against the interests of crime victims and wider society, and possibly also of 
appearing to condone the criminality (if the potential informer refuses to assist the investigators). 
Intuitively such despoliation, and the moral dilemma to which it gives rise, seem harder to justify. 
 
There are circumstances in which the killing of an individual by police can be both morally 
and lawfully justified.56
 
   Against this measure the corruption of a relationship in which the parties 
continue to live, albeit on different terms, seems the lesser harm and so in need of a less stringent 
moral justification. It is not at all clear, however, that these different categories of harms are truly 
comparable. Police intervention (in the form of informer recruitment) into a dysfunctional familial 
relationship may be more cathartic and therapeutic than harmful. The investigators may have no 
feasible or reasonable means of assessing this before initiating the intervention.  
 
 
Conclusion: towards a professional ethic for informers? 
It has been argued here that informing can be accommodated within a moral theory of 
policing and that, to the extent that their actions facilitate the morally justifiable purpose of policing 
as a social institution, the conduct of informers is encompassed within this over-arching moral 
theory just as is the conduct of police officers when acting as such. Can this line of argument be 
taken further? Can it be argued that alongside the ethical framework for informing as a function, 
there can be established a professional ethic for informers? 
 
                                                          
56 Arguably killing is the most significant moral harm that can be inflicted upon an individual yet it is amenable 
to moral justification, particularly where not to intervene would result in greater harm (for example where a 
gunman randomly shooting passers-by in the street is shot dead by a police marksman if that is the only 
practical and least harmful means of preventing the gunman killing others). 
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Whether policing can be regarded as a profession is debatable. 57
 
  Those employed in 
policing can certainly aspire to professionalism and it can be argued that policing brings with it 
certain role-specific obligations and reasonable role-related public expectations of those who are 
police officers. The line of argument that extends the moral theory of policing to encompass the 
conduct of informers cannot obviously be applied to the idea that, in serving the policing purpose, 
an informer necessarily assumes the professional obligations of the police (and therefore any 
professional police ethic). Such a proposition is undermined significantly in two ways. Firstly, 
informers are not police officers, trained or employed as such. They are providers of information for 
the purpose of policing. As providers they have no responsibility and cannot be held accountable for 
the way in which the police use the information so provided to further the purpose of policing.   
Nor do informers have any responsibility to enforce the law beyond a citizen’s civic 
obligation to obey the law and prevent or resist crime. Herein lies the second fundamental flaw: it is 
their disinclination to adhere to this civic duty that places most (potential) informers in a position 
where they can in fact access and provide information that cannot be obtained by other (less 
morally problematic) means.58  If, for sake of argument, the law can be envisaged as black or white, 
then policing necessarily requires shades of grey, in the shadow of which will be found the function 
of informing. The Australian Independent Commission Against Corruption [ICAC] has concluded: 
“what it all comes down to is this that wrongful means must not be used to achieve noble ends”. 59
 
  
It is by no means as clear-cut as that, and an ethical framework, such as that proposed above, helps 
navigation of these murky moral waters. 
                                                          
57 See Kleinig, Ethics of Policing, chapter 3 for a presentation of the issues and arguments. 
 
58 Of course not all informers are criminal: there are those, for example, who are recruited to inform because 
of the professional or employment position that they hold. But the majority of individuals recruited as 
informers are likely to have criminal associates even if they are not actively engaged in crime themselves.  
 
59 ICAC, Report on Investigation into the Use of Informers vol 1, (Sydney: ICAC, 1993) 118. 
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Informing as a tactic of investigation and surveillance confronts the moral theory of policing 
with its most contentious challenges. The circumstances in which a police officer might be justified in 
killing someone can be defined more precisely than the circumstances in which recourse to an 
informer, particularly the recruitment of a child or spouse, can be justified. That which can be 
justified for the purposes of policing may not be justifiable merely as an advantage to the police: 
whilst informing might be justified under the moral theory of policing adopted here, recruiting 
certain categories of informers cannot so readily be justified, notwithstanding that their deployment 
and product would be capable of moral justification. This has implications for the governance and 
regulation of informer management.  That which is lawful is not necessarily moral; that which is 
unlawful is not necessarily immoral (and in each case, vice versa). Governance regimes typically 
utilise bureaucratic accountability to demonstrate (a semblance of) transparency. This is not 
inherently a bad thing but governance mechanisms do not necessarily address moral issues. It does 
not follow that because resource allocation and utilization can be economically or politically justified 
that it is also morally justified.  
 
This paper has demonstrated that the act and process of informing - passing information 
about an individual covertly to a third party for exploitation by that third party that will adversely 
affect the subject of the information - is a significant moral wrong. In defined circumstances, 
consistent with the moral theory of policing, claims can be made for the justifiable use of informing 
where it facilitates the overcoming or remedying of a greater moral wrong (a serious crime for 
instance) and protects the morally enforceable rights of persons who would otherwise be harmed by 
that greater moral wrong.   The process of informing, including its component elements such as 
informer recruitment and the management processes, 60
                                                          
60 These processes operate in multiple arenas: management of informers by handlers; management of 
handlers by their senior managers; upward management of decision-makers by those seeking authority to use 
informers.  
carries with it parallel moral concerns.  
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Where the appeal to the moral theory of policing is derivative rather than substantive additional 
justification is warranted. 
 
 
 
